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Abstract
Researchers now use the lab to examine the behavioral underpinnings of valuation before the field 
application which some argue has less experimental control.  But lab valuation work raises its own set of 
concerns when it uses private goods to explore nonmarket valuation behavior because private goods have 
substitutes often unaccounted for in the lab.  Therefore, the lab as a tool to testbed field valuation work 
may be limited.  Herein we design an induced valuation experiment to explore bidding behavior in a 
second-price auction with an outside option that is a perfect substitute for the auction commodity. Theory 
predicts that rational bidders will consider the prices of outside options when formulating bidding 
strategies, and will reduce their bids whenever their resale value exceeds the price of the outside option.  
Our results suggest that bidders account for outside options, but not to the extent dictated by rational 
choice theory.  In addition, we provide initial evidence concerning hypothetical versus actual behavior 
with induced values—the data suggest that behavior is similar across real and hypothetical settings.
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1. Introduction
Laboratory experiments have become a popular tool to explore the behavioral 
underpinnings in non-market valuation.1  Researchers use the experimental control of the lab 
to investigate how people react to design incentives behind valuation questions prior to field 
application (see Coursey and Schulze, 1986).  But lab valuation work raises its own set of 
concerns when it uses private goods to examine nonmarket valuation behavior because 
private goods have substitutes often unaccounted for in the lab.  Consequently, the lab as a 
tool to testbed field valuation may suffer.  If the concerns over uncontrolled incentives in the 
lab are accurate, then laboratory findings in the lab are as open to challenge as the field work 
the lab research criticizes. 
Herein we explore whether lab valuation work with private goods suffers from a lack 
of control due to market substitutes acting as an outside option.  Our general concern in this 
study is with experiments designed to elicit individual values for a private good.  The problem 
we consider arises from the observation that lab valuation exercises usually do not explicitly 
account for the behavioral implications of field substitutes for the lab commodity.2   A 
researcher might view the lab auction as producing bids and values for a unique good, when 
in fact the bidding behavior reflects the price of an unmeasured outside option.3  With the loss 
of control, valuation results from the lab may be less instructive for non-market valuation than 
previously thought. 
The problem is illustrated with an example.  Neill et al. (1994), for instance, use the 
classic incentive-compatible second-price auction to examine the disparity between 
hypothetical and real bids for a work of art (Vickrey, 1961). Figure 1 shows the baseline 
demand curve for the art piece, DV, as the schedule of individual values vi  in the absence of 
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an outside option. If the artwork is unique, each bidder’s dominant strategy is to bid vi. But if 
bidders know the artwork is for sale at a local gallery, each high-value bidder’s new dominant 
strategy is to shave his bid downward to the outside option price (assuming zero transactions 
costs).  In effect, the demand curve for the art shifts inward due to the introduction of the 
perfect substitute sold at choke price poo, yielding the choked-demand curve, D00.4 
It remains an open question whether bidders actually account for an outside option 
when bidding in the lab.  That is, which demand curve is being observed in the lab, DV or 
D00?  Moreover, is the answer invariant to the elicitation mechanism?  The answer matters to 
the interpretation of bidder behavior. Some observers have suggested that the lab may be 
capturing D00 when payments are real, and DV when payments are hypothetical (Smith, 1994; 
p. 141).  If true, the existence of uncontrolled outside options might explain the oft-observed
gap between hypothetical valuation statements and real economic commitments. 
In this paper we design an induced valuation experiment to explore whether bidders in 
both hypothetical and actual second-price auctions consider the existence of outside options 
when formulating bid strategies.  Induced values allow us to control the baseline and choked 
demand curves, and thereby focus attention on bidding behavior rather than on the elicitation 
of unobservable private valuations or perceived outside option prices, or both.  And while 
hypothetical and actual behavior has received considerable attention in the literature, to the 
authors’ knowledge this study provides the first comparison of such behavior in an induced 
valuation setting.  Our major results are threefold: (a) bidders consider outside options when 
formulating bids, and this behavior is more likely with experience.  This result is consistent 
with comparative static predictions—a lower outside option price results in lower bids; (b) the 
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second-price auction overestimates the choked demand; and (c) bidding behavior in the 
presence of the outside option is consistent across real and hypothetical auctions. 
 
2.  Experimental Design and Bidding Behavior 
Our experiment used a 2x3 treatment design to test for bid shaving in the presence of 
an outside option.  The treatment conditions involved real or hypothetical payments, and three 
uniform outside option prices; $2, $4 or $6.  All other design features were the same across 
treatments−ten bidders and ten rounds, and in each round a ‘good’ was sold in a Vickrey 
second-price auction, in which the highest bidder wins and pays the second-highest bidder’s 
bid.5   
In each round, the monitor assigned each bidder his or her unique induced baseline 
value for the good, or resale value vi. The resale value is the price at which the bidder could 
sell the good to the monitor after the auction.  We used ten private resale values to create the 
baseline induced demand curve DV  – $8.4, 7.6, 7.1, 6.8, 6.5, 5.3, 3.8, 2.4, 1.8, 0.9.  Each 
bidder was assigned a different resale value in each round of bidding.  In addition, there was 
an outside option that allowed each bidder the opportunity to buy the good in a secondary 
market at a posted uniform price (either $2, $4 or $6) with no transaction costs. 
Bidders used a bid slip that served three purposes.  The bid slip (i) informed the bidder 
of his resale value; (ii) was the bid mechanism for the auction; and (iii) indicated whether a 
losing bidder wanted to buy the good in the secondary outside option market.  At the end of 
each round, the monitor collected bid slips, calculated profits for each bidder, recorded the 
individual results on the bid slip, and returned the slips to the bidders so they could follow the 
results of their actions.  Profits equaled the difference between the resale value and the price 
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the bidder paid for the good, either in the auction or in the secondary market.  If a bidder did 
not purchase the good, his profit was zero for that round.  In the real payments sessions, total 
profits for all ten sessions were paid to bidders in cash at the end of the experiment.  Only the 
winner saw the two highest bids.6  
Theory says that in a second-price auction without an outside option, a rational 
bidder’s dominant strategy is to bid his resale value vi (Vickrey, 1961).  But, with an outside 
option, his optimal bid strategy bi now depends on whether the price of the outside option poo 















Holding the baseline demand curve constant, simple comparative statics suggest that 
as the price of the outside option falls, bids will decrease.  Aggregate baseline demand is 
computed as the summation of resale values, or $50.6 per round.  For the $2 option price 
treatments, strictly rational bid behavior would yield about 37 percent of the baseline 
demand, (8*$2+$1.8+$0.9 = $18.7 of $50.6).  Similarly, for the $4 and $6 treatments, strictly 
rational bidding would produce about 65 percent of baseline demand, 
(6*$4+3.8+2.4+$1.8+$0.9 = $32.9 of $50.6); and about 87 percent of baseline demand, 
(5*$6+$5.3+$3.8+2.4+$1.8+$0.9 = $44.2 of $50.6). 
 
3. Results 
Three useful results emerge.  First, bid shaving exists, as measured by the percentage 
of total bids per round relative to the baseline demand of $50.6 per round.   Table 1 shows 
that this behavior is relatively robust across treatments for both experienced and 
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inexperienced bidders, ranging between a low of 49.6 percent of baseline demand in round 4 
of treatment A to a high of 114.4 percent in round 6 of treatment C.   Summing across rounds 
of the real treatments A-C, the real auction elicited 76 percent of baseline demand ($1149.9 of 
$1518 (=$50.6x10x3)); summing across rounds of the hypothetical treatments D-F, the 
hypothetical auction captured 77 percent of baseline demand ($1162.5 of $1518).   Using a 
Robust Rank-order double sided test, we reject the hypothesis of equality between the real 
and baseline demand (z = 5.81), and the hypothetical and baseline demand (z = 5.90) at the p 
< .01 level.7 
Table 1 also shows that bid shaving was consistent with comparative static 
predictions—as the outside option price decreases, bid shaving increases.  Comparing 
observed behavior in round 10 of the real auctions, for instance, shows that as price increased 
from $2 to $4 to $6, total bids decreased from $48.6 to $34.4 to $25.2.  This pattern was 
consistent across all rounds in the real treatments A-C, and in seven rounds in the 
hypothetical treatments D-F.  Overall, the bulk of evidence suggests that bidders, in general, 
considered the outside option when formulating their bid strategies, and shaved their bids 
accordingly.  
Our second major finding is that, although bid shaving exists, bidding behavior is not 
strictly rational; bidders who shaved bids do not necessarily bid exactly the price of the 
outside option.  Table 2 reveals that strict rationality is relatively low for both real (17.9 
percent, or 34 of 190 predicted bids) and hypothetical bids (18.4 percent; 35 of 190 predicted 
bids).8  Statistical tests suggest that both real and hypothetical bidding schedules are 
significantly above the choked demand curve (in a Robust Rank-order double sided 
procedure: z = 2.42 for real and z = 3.50 for hypothetical).  This result is consistent with the 
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general observation from previous induced value experiments that overbidding tends to occur 
in second-price auctions (see Kagel’s 1995 overview). 
Somewhat broader definitions of rationality better organize bidding behavior.  Weak 
rationality allows for experimentation (+/-10 cents around the outside option price), and 
captures 36.3 percent (69 of 190) of real bids, and 33.2 percent (63 of 190) of hypothetical 
bids.  Prudent rationality accounts for extra cautious behavior (within 10 cents above or 
anywhere below the outside option price), and accounts for 55.8 percent of real bids (106 of 
190), and 43.2 percent of hypothetical bids (82 of 190).   These statistics suggest that subjects 
shave bids according to outside option prices, but not to the precision dictated by rational 
choice theory.   
Our third result is that bid shaving is equally likely in real and hypothetical auctions.  
The hypothetical auctions elicited 84.4 percent ($1281.8) of the baseline demand; or 76.5 
percent ($1161.8) if we omit two bids ($90 and $30) as outliers.  Using a Robust Rank-order 
test, we find no significant difference between the hypothetical and actual auctions (z = 1.18).  
A comparison of mean bids between the hypothetical and actual contexts using a t-test yields 
a similar conclusion. These results hold with or without the two outlier bids.  
This third finding does not support Smith’s (1994) suggestion that the existence of 
outside options may help explain differences in laboratory behavior when payments are real 
relative to when payments are hypothetical.9  Bidders confronting an outside option were not 
more likely to bid their baseline value in a hypothetical context relative to the real context.  
But this finding is what one should expect if bidders take market incentives seriously, even in 
a hypothetical setting.  To argue that bidders shave real bids subject to outside options, but 
not hypothetical bids, is to argue that they selectively ignore key components of the construct 
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market—in this case, the outside option.  We see no convincing reason why bidders who treat 
hypothetical primary markets seriously would not regard all incentives seriously, including 
hypothetical secondary markets.  In fact, if we had not observed bid shaving in the 
hypothetical treatments, one would have reason to question the internal validity of bidding 
behavior within this context (see Diamond, 1996). 
We reinforce the unconditional real/hypothetical result using a Probit model: 
      ψ = α + β1T + β2(DhT) + β3Resale + β4(DhResale) + ∑ΦiZi + ε,  (1) 
where ψ = 1 if rationality is observed, 0 otherwise;  Dh represents a dichotomous variable that 
equals 1 for hypothetical bids, 0 otherwise;  T represents a time trend (1,2,3,…10); β1T is the 
time trend for the real auctions, and therefore (β1 + β2)T is the learning time trend deviation in 
the hypothetical auctions; β3Resale and β4(DhResale) control for the subject’s resale value in 
each round; ∑ΦiZi are treatment effects that capture specific variation systematically related 
to the treatment; α is the estimated intercept, and ε is the well-behaved error term.   
Table 3 presents estimation results from equation (1) for each of the definitions of 
rationality.10  We split the sample based on the bid strategy decision rule, resale>outside 
option and resale<outside option, and present empirical results for the three classifications of 
rationality when subjects are expected to shave bids.11 Overall, parameter estimates – which 
are marginal effects computed at the overall sample means – confirm our previous 
unconditional results and suggest that bidders are equally likely to shave bids whether or not 
the context is hypothetical or real.  For 14 of the 15 treatment coefficient estimates, we find 
that the $2, $4, and $6 dichotomous regressors are not different from the $2 hypothetical 
baseline at conventional significance levels.  The sole significant dummy is the Hypothetical 
$4 variable in the Prudent specification.  Our empirical results also suggest some subjects 
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learned to shave bids with experience, as parameter estimates on the time trends are 
consistently positive, although only one is significantly different from zero at conventional 
levels (the Weak specification).   
5. Concluding Comments
This note evaluates one key issue in the use of laboratory experiments to testbed field 
non-market valuation exercises: we consider how an outside option affects aggregate and 
individual bidding behavior in a second-price auction.  Our results support the view that 
people in second-price auctions do in fact consider outside options when formulating bid 
strategies.  Bidders shave bids toward the price of the outside option, although they tended to 
bid higher than that predicted by the rational choked demand curve.   
The implications for future nonmarket valuation research are two-fold.  First, the 
results reject outside options as the explanation of the gap between hypothetical statements 
and real economic commitments often observed in the laboratory valuation literature.  Real 
and hypothetical bid shaving was observed in near equal proportions, as should be expected if 
one believes that rational bidders treat real and hypothetical incentives with equal seriousness.  
Second, bid shaving is a specific case of the more general valuation question on how 
unobserved private actions (e.g., personal skill in reducing job or environmental risk) can 
affect revealed preferences for collective policies (see Shogren and Crocker, 1991).  The 
results herein support the general idea that uncovering otherwise hidden private actions 
deserves more attention in non-market valuation work.  
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Notes
1 Examples include laboratory validation of hypothetical survey methods (e.g., Neill et al., 
1994; Cummings et al., 1995; List and Shogren, 1998), examination of the WTP/WTA 
disparity (e.g., Kahneman et al., 1990; Shogren et al., 1994), new product valuation (e.g., 
Hoffman et al., 1993), and elicitation of individual discount rates (e.g., Benzion et al., 1989; 
Coller and Williams, 1999). 
2 Two exceptions are Coller and Williams (1999) and Harrison et al. (1999), in which the 
experimenters elicit subject perceptions of the price of alternative field substitutes and then 
control for these variables in the data analysis.  Harrison (1989) and Smith (1994) take field 
substitutes into account when interpreting experimental data. 
3 Harrison (1989) introduced the argument, and then expanded it in Harrison et al. (1995). 
4 This exposition is simplified in the sense that we do not consider the existence of imperfect 
substitutes or diverse subject perceptions of outside option prices and/or transactions costs. 
These technical complications do not affect the general implications of the present study, or 
are they germane to our experimental design, so their discussion is suppressed here. 
5 To minimize ending round effects, no information was provided to the subject regarding the 
number of rounds the experiment would last. 
6 Bidders were recruited campus-wide from the student body at the University of Wyoming. 
Participation was voluntary and not part of their class evaluation.  Written instructions were 
distributed and read aloud. A written quiz followed with a subsequent discussion to ensure 
bidders understood the dominant strategy of the second-price auction.  Each experimental 
session lasted about an hour and the average bidder earned $20.   
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7 We use the Robust Rank-order double sided test to determine whether the elicited demand 
curve is statistically different from the induced demand curve (Siegel and Castellan, 1988). 
The responses were pooled with the induced values and ranked in order of size. The test 







=   where X denotes the induced values, Y denotes the distribution 
of subject’s bids, n and m denotes the sample sizes of Y and X, Vx and VY denote the variance 
of the rank in samples X and Y, and  U  is the number of Y observations 
with a lower rank than each X observation. For sample sizes larger than 12, U approaches a 
normal distribution, (Siegel and Castellan, 1988).  The estimated test statistic is equal to 5.81, 











8 Comparing proportions over all subjects, 190 bids should be censored across all rounds in 
the real treatment, and likewise for the hypothetical treatment. 
9 For more discussion on the gap between hypothetical and real behavior, see for example 
Neill et al. (1994), List et al. (1998), Fox et al. (1998), Johannesson (1997), or Harrison and 
Rutström (1999).  
10 Overall, χ2 tests of model significance suggest that the bidding model explains a significant 
amount of the variation in the regressand, as a majority of the model types are significant at 
conventional levels (critical values of χ2(9 d.f.) = 14.68 (10%), 16.92 (5%), and 21.67 (1%). 
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Table 1.  Aggregate Bidding Behavior by Treatment and Rounda,b,c,d 
Treat- Real or Price of Aggregate Observed  Aggregate Bids 
ment Hypo- Outside Choked 
 thetical Option Demand  Round 
Bid 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10        Total 
A Real $2 $18. 7 $29.4 29.2 25.4 25.1 25.9 30.6 32.1 28.2 29.7 25.2    $280.8 
37%a 58.1 57.7 50.2 49.6 51.2 60.5 63.4 55.7 58.7 49.8        55.5 
B Real $4 $32. 9 $38.8 49.0 25.2 47.5 30.3 25.3 28.3 35.4 32.3 34.4    $346.5 
65% 76.7 96.8 49.8 93.4 59.9 50.0 55.9 70.0 63.8 68.0         68.5 
C Real $6 $44.2 $51.2 49.3 48.0 51.9 55.9 57.9 54.8 48.4 56.6 48.6    $522.6 
87% 101.2 97.4 94.9 102.0 110.5 114.4 108.3 95.7 111.9 96.0        103.3 
Subtotal  
$95.8 $119.4  127.5 98.6 124.5 112.1 113.8 115.2 112.0 118.6 108.2     $1149.9 
63% 78.7 84.0 65.0 82.0 73.8 75.0 75.9 73.8 78.1 71.3           76    
D Hypo $2 $18.7 $35.7 42.5 38.2 35.1 30.0 28.2 28.0 30.9 27.0 29.8    $325.4 
37% 70.6 84.0 75.5 69.4 59.3 55.7 55.3 61.1 53.4 58.9         64.3 
E Hypo $4 $32.9 $40.6 42.1 40.4 41.1 37.1 39.6 34.6 37.3 38.3 41.4    $392.5 
65% 80.2 83.2 79.8 81.2 73.3 78.3 68.4 73.7 75.7 81.8         77.6 
F Hypo $6 $44.2 $38.9 46.8 39.6b 46.5 35.8c 44.8 51.2 45.1 51.7 44.2    $444.6 
87% 76.9 92.5 91.0d 91.9 81.7d 88.5 101.2 89.1 102.2 87.4         87.9 
Subtotal 
$95.8 $115.2 131.4 118.2d 122.7 102.9d 112.6 113.8 113.3 117.0 115.4     $1162.5 
63% 75.9 86.6 81.7d 80.8 71.0d 74.2 75.0 74.6 77.1 76.0            77 
a. Percentage of  total baseline demand (baseline demand=$50.6 per round).
b. A bid equal to $30 treated as outlier and omitted.
c. A bid equal to $90 treated as outlier and omitted.
d. Corrected for the outliers.
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Table 2.  Breakdown of Rational Behavior by Treatment and Rounda,b,c, 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
Treat-  Real or  Price of Ratio-   Observed Bidding Behavior 
ment  Hypo-  outside nality*    Round 
thetical option               1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
A Real $2 S 0(0) a 1(12) 1(12) 2(25) 1(12) 1(12) 0(0) 3(37) 0(0) 2(25) 
W 1(12) 2(25) 3(37) 4(50) 3(37) 4(50) 3(37) 5(62) 3(37) 4(50) 
P 2(25) 4(50) 4(50) 5(62) 5(62) 4(50) 5(62) 6(75) 5(62) 5(62) 
B Real $4 S 0(0) b 2(33) 1(17) 2(33) 2(33) 3(50) 3(50) 3(50) 1(17) 2(33) 
W 1(17) 2(33) 3(50) 3(50) 3(50) 3(50) 4(67) 3(50) 3(50) 4(67) 
P 3(50) 4(67) 6(100) 3(50) 5(83) 5(83) 6(100) 3(50) 5(83) 5(83) 
C Real $6 S 0(0) c 0(0) 1(20) 1(20) 1(20) 1(20) 0(0) 0(0) 0(0) 0(0) 
W 1(20) 0(0) 2(40) 1(20) 1(20) 1(20) 0(0) 1(20) 0(0) 1(0) 
P 3(60) 1(20) 2(40) 2(40) 1(20) 2(40) 0(0) 3(60) 0(0) 2(40) 
________________________________________________________________________________ 
subtotal 0(0) 3(16) 3(16) 5(26) 4(21) 5(26) 3(16) 6(32) 1(5) 4(21) 
3(16) 4(21) 8(42) 8(42) 7(37) 8(42) 7(37) 9(47) 6(32) 9(47) 
8(42) 9(47)  12(63) 10(53)11(58) 11(58)11(58) 12(63)10(53) 12(63) 
D Hypo $2 S 1(12) a1(12) 2(25) 2(25) 1(12) 2 (25) 0(0) 1(12) 2(25) 2(25) 
W 1(12) 1(12) 2(25) 3(37) 3(37) 3(37) 2(25) 3(37) 3(37) 3(37) 
P 3(37) 1(12) 2(25) 4(50) 3(37) 5(62) 3(37) 4(50) 3(37) 4(50) 
E Hypo $4 S 0(0) b 1(17) 1(17) 1(17) 0(0) 2(33) 2(33) 2(33) 2(33) 2(33) 
W 0(0) 1(17) 2(33) 3(50) 1(17) 4(67) 2(33) 4(67) 4(67) 3(50) 
P 1(17) 3(50) 3(50) 3(50) 2(33) 4(67) 4(67) 4(67) 4(67) 3(50) 
F Hypo $6 S 0(0) c 2(40) 0(0) 1(0) 0(0) 1(0) 1(20) 2(40) 0(0) 1(20) 
W 0(0) 2(40) 0(0) 3(60) 0(0) 3(60) 1(20) 4(80) 0(0) 2(40) 
P 2(40) 2(40) 0(0) 3(60) 1(20) 4(80) 1(20) 4(80) 0(0) 2(40) 
________________________________________________________________________________ 
subtotal 1(5) 4(21) 3(16) 4(21) 1(5) 5(26) 3(16) 5((26) 4(21) 5(26) 
1(5) 4(21) 4(21) 9(47) 4(21) 10(53) 5(26) 11(58) 7(37) 8(42) 
6(32) 6(32) 5(26) 10(53) 6(32) 13(68)8(42) 12(63) 7(37) 9(47) 
________________________________________________________________________________ 
The first number in each cell represents the number of observed rational bids; the number in parentheses represents 
the percentage of observed rational relative to predicted rational bids.  
* S-Strict rationality—high value (vi>p00) bidders censor at the outside option price; W-Weak rationality—high
value bidders censor at +/- 10 cents of the outside option price; and P-Prudent rationality—high value bidders censor 
at 10 cents above or anywhere below the outside option price. 
a. 8 subjects are predicted to censor their bid.
b. 6 subjects are predicted to censor their bid.
c. 5 subjects are predicted to censor their bid.
15
Table 3.  Estimation Results for Bid Functionsa,b,c,d,e 
Resale > Outside Option
Variable Strict Weak  Prudent
Constant -0.21 -0.14 0.28
(-1.7) (-0.90) (1.5)
Time  0.008 0.03 0.01
(0.85) (2.1) (0.89) 
DhTime 0.004 0.01 0.01
(0.30) (0.64) (0.56) 
Resale -0.009 -0.03 -0.05 
(-0.43) (-1.10) (-1.65) 
DhResale -0.007 -0.02 -0.04 
(-0.27) (-0.50) (-1.01) 
Hyp. 4 0.04 0.16 0.20
(0.60) (1.9) (2.22) 
Hyp. 6 0.007 0.07 0.09
(0.10) (0.79) (0.92) 
Real 2 -0.07 0.05 -0.02
(-0.40) (0.21) (-0.06)
Real 4 0.10 0.18 0.22
(0.52) (0.71) (0.78) 
Real 6 -0.12 -0.15 -0.19 
(-0.58) (-0.58) (-0.68) 
χ2(9 d.f.) 16.1 34.0 42.9
N 380 380 380
aDependent variable is equal to 1 if rational, 0 otherwise. 
bDh represents dummy variable for hypothetical auction. 
cHyp. j (Real j) represents hypothetical (real) treatment with the jth value for the outside option and represent deviations 
from the baseline Hyp. 2 treatment. 
dParameter estimates are marginal effects computed at the sample means. 
et-statistics in parentheses under coefficient estimates. 
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